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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENE WHEADON and DEANE 
WHEADON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
GEORGE B. PEARSON and SARAH K. 
PEARSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents 
PRELIMINARY STATEME·N·T 
Case 
No. 9696 
Because of the frequent reference in matters quoted 
in this brief to the parties as they appeared in the trial 
court, the parties will be referred to as they appeared 
in the trial court, as follows: 
Gene Wheadon and Deane \Vheadon, as Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, are herein called ''Plaintiffs" 
George ~L Pearson and Sarah K. Pearson, as De-
fendants and Respondents, are herein called "De-
fendants." 
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Defendants agree, in general. with the l'adH a~ 
stated in the brief of the plaintifl'~. hut not the eon-
elusions reached by plaintiffs in their brief. Defendants 
point out to the Court that there wen• two separatP 
suits filed by these same plaintiffs agaim~t these same 
defendants, only one of whieh is involved in this appeal. 
For the purpose of this brief, herPaftPr the firHt suit, 
filed on February 1-t, 1961 a~ ca~e No. J :2~)-t;)() in thP 
District Court shall be referred to as the ''first suit," 
and the second suit, having been filed on April 19, 1 !)(j~ 
as Case Xo. 136131, shall be rpferred to as the "second 
suit." (R 5) 
The first suit was plac.ed in issue het WP(·n the part iP~ 
and the case came on for pretrial on tJanunr:· J :2, 1 !Hi:2. 
At pretrial this suit was dis1nissed upon a n1otion for 
sun1mary judgment. On January 23, l!Hi:2, a nwtion for 
new trial was filed by the plaintiffs and was supported 
by several affidavits. This motion for nnv trial wa~ 
argued and submitted to the Court on ~[arch 1, 1962, 
and plaintiffs' motion was denied hy the Honorable 
Ray Van Cott, Jr. On April 19, 1962, plaintiffs filed 
the second suit against the same defendants. On ~I a~· 
.J-, 1962, t'he defendants filed a motion to dismiss as to 
the second suit. (R 8) This motion of the defendants 
was granted by the H·onorable ~fareellus J(. Snow on 
~1:ay 4, 1962. (R 11) 
Plaintiffs have only appealed from the order dis-
m,issing the second suit because the time for appeal has 
elapsed in the first suit. The ti1ne for appeal in the 
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first suit had elapsed before the second suit was filed 
by the plaintiffs. The statement of facts included in the 
brief of the plaintiffs (appellants) shows that the plain-
tiffs in the first suit "sued defendants for the purpose 
of establishing the existence of a permanent easmnent, 
appurtenant to plaintiffs' land, across defendants' land." 
(page 2 of appellants' brief) In the second suit •· ... 
Plaintiffs again seek to establish a permanent easen1ent 
appurtenant to their land across the defendants' land, but 
on an entirely different cause of action." Although the 
plaintiffs clai1n is an "entirely different cause of ac-
tion,'' the defendants say it is the same cause of action. 
(page 2 of appellants' brief) It is i1nportant, there-
fore, to point out some of the material issues which 
·were pleaded and argued in both of the cases. 
In the first suit, which was filed by ~ir. Ray S. 
:McCarty, as the attorney for the plaintiffs, it is alleged 
that the plaintiffs were owners of a certain tract of 
land situated in Salt Lake County and the defendants 
were owners of other land adjacent to the plaintiffs, 
and 
" ... there has been a lane or road of fifteen or 
twenty feet in width which is now, and for more 
than thirty years has been, used by the plaintiffs, 
their grantors and predecessors in interest and 
by divers other persons as a vehicular and pedes-
trian road to gain ingress and egress to and from 
the above described real property of plaintiff 
and to other real property located by plaintiffs' 
land, under claim of right of user, and plaintiffs 
and others have notoriously and openly used said 
land and road under a right for more than thirty 
years, which lane and road extends from a county 
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road, 13800 South, along the canal to the plain-
tiffs' property." (paragraph3 of page 2 of plain-
tiffs' complaint in Case No. 129450) 
It was also further alleged : 
"There is no other way that the plaintiffs can 
get to and from their land, and they are unable 
to irrigate or tend said property." (paragraph 
5 of page 2 of plaintiffs' c01nplaint in case number 
129450) 
As a matter of relief in the first case the plaintiffs 
prayed for judgment as follows : 
"1. For an order and decree restraining de-
fendants, and all other persons chtiming by them 
or under them, fron1 interfering with plaintiffs' 
right-of-way in and out of said land for that pur-
pose, or asserting any claim or interest in said 
property inconsistent with such use and right of 
plaintiffs." (Prayer of plaintiffs' cornplaint, page 
2 of Case No. 129450) 
To this pleading the defendants denied that the 
plaintiffs had any right-of-way or easement across the 
property, and counterclaimed for damages caused to 
the properly of the defendants, and the matter was put 
at issue. Demand was then made for trial of the issues. 
Pursuant to the Rules of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County in effect at that tin1e, the parties 
submitted a Statement of Fac,1:s in connection with the 
demand for trial in the subject case. In the Statement 
of Facts the following statement was submitted to the 
Court and signed by the respective attorneys for both 
of the parties : 
"This case involves the claim by the plain-
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tiffs t'o a right-of-way across the property of 
the defendants. The defendants claim that the 
plaintiffs do not have a right-of-way. Each of 
the respective parties claim damages for inter-
ference ·with the right-of-way, and the defendants 
claiming the damages because of the use of the 
property without 'having a right-of~way. The issue 
in this case is clear and concise: 
ISSUE 
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a right-
of-way of (sic) (over) the property described 
in the complaint. 
2. Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled 
to damages or whether or not the defendants 
are entitled to any damages." (See file on Case 
No. 129450) 
The matter came on for pretrial on January 12, 
1962, before the Honorable Ray Van 1Cott, Jr. ; and at 
that time ~I r. Ray S. :McCarty, appearing as attorney 
for the plaintiffs, said that his claim for an easement 
was based upon a prescribed right of long nse. Dis-
cussion was had and documentary evidence was sub-
mitted to the pretrial judge. Upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment made by defendants' attorney the Court 
granted 1the motion based upon the record showing that 
the property had been in single ownership of both tracts 
within the twenty-year prescriptive period. The order 
of dismissal was entered by the Court. 
Within the time prescribed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a motion for a new trial was made, 
together with the entrance of appearance of the attorney 
Mr. Roger K. Bean of Bean & Bean for and on behalf 
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·of the plaintiffs. The n1otion for a nPw trial was based 
upon the grounds set forth in the n1otion, and providPd 
under Rule 59, URCP, as follows : 
.. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict of other decision, or that it is against 
law," and 
''Error in law" 
In connection with the rnotion for a new trial, ~Pv­
eral affidavits were subnritted to tlw Court h~r the plain-
tiffs. These affidavits can be surrunarized as ~aying 
that the property was at one time in single ownership 
and that each had used the property of the defendants 
as a right-of-way for a long period of tim<'. 
The motion for a new trial, togethPr wi,th the al'l'i-
davits, was called up for hearing before the Honorable 
Ray Van Cott on February '27, 1962, at w'hieh time thP 
attorney Roger Bean appeared for and on behalf of 
the plaintiffs and the attorney Dean E. Conder appeared 
for and on behalf of the defendants. The matter was 
argued before The Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. ; and 
Mr. Bean argued the information contained in the affi-
davits, and in particular ~the affidavit of Gene Wheadon, 
in whi~h he says : 
" ... the use of said road is necessa.ry for ingress 
and egress between the public highway (13800 
South) and that part of affiant's land which 
lies southeast ·of the East Jordan Company Canal; 
that all of the products raised on said parcel 
must be removed therefrom by means of said 
road; that affiant always used the said road 
for transportation to the highway of crops raised 
on said land, and for the ingress and egress to 
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administer to the needs of the poultry ranged 
thereon." (emphasis added) 
In the oral argu1nent before the Court the plaintiffs 
pointed out the common ownership of the property, 
the severance, the use of the right-of-way and the need 
for it. 
T'he cause of action which the plaintiffs plead in 
the second suit is identical \vith that pleaded in the first 
suit in that they seek to establish an easement over 
exactly the same property of the defendants. The allega-
tion which the~~ now plead in the second suit is as an 
easement by necessirty or by implication. This is exactly 
what was claimed in the affidavits filed with the Motion 
for N erw Trial in the first suit. 
The defendants in pleading to rthe complaint of the 
plaintiffs' second suit filed a motion to dismiss upon 
the grounds of res judicata, since the matter had been 
fully disposed of in the first cause of action. This 
motion was then heard before the Honorable l\Iarcellus 
K. Snow, and a judgment was entered dismissing the 
plaintiffs' second cause of action. It is the judgment 
dismissing plaintiffs' second cause of action which they 
are seeking to reverse by this appeal. 
ARGU:M:ENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS 
OF RES JUDICATA. 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiffs are seek-
ing a second bite at the pie on the matter that was 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sub1nitted to the trial court in the first ~uit. They H'P:i\ 
the same thing in both actions, namely, .. an easement." 
The n1atter of an ease1nent by nt-ee~~ity or an implied 
easement was submitted to the court in thP fir~t :-;uit 
by reason of the affidavits and argun1ents in support 
of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. 
Even if we assume for the purpose of this argument 
that the matter of an easement by nece~sity or an im-
plied easement was not subn1itted to the court in tli<' 
first suit, it nevertheless was included in the "<·au:-;p of 
action'' of the first suit wherein the plaintiffs sought 
an ease1nent over the propt>rty of the dPfendants. 
In the discussion of whether or not a can:-;(' of 
action is res judicata as to a subsequent aetion, Prol'<'~­
sor Moore states the following: 
''Here the problem is Pssentially one of fair-
ness, and one of ad1ninistrative policy designed 
to end litigation: Have the parties litigated or 
had a reasonable opportunity to litigate the same 
or similar type of issues now rai3ed." (llfoorr· 's 
Federal Practice, Volume II, Page 378) 
The Supreme Court of 1he United States in two 
important decisions has discussed this matter of the 
plea in judgment. The first case was the ease of United 
States vs. California and 0. Land C01npany (1904) 192 
U.S. 355, 24 S.Ct. 266, 48 L.I~d. 476. In ~this case an 
action was brought to have certain patents for lands 
declared void, on the grounds that the lands were within 
an Indian reservation. The land company pleaded the 
mrutter of res judicata, saying that there had already 
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been a prior suit and a final decree in which this matter 
was determined. The trial court dismissed the bill. The 
Supreme Court of the United States said thrut the only 
thing they could find distinguishing the two cases was 
that in the latter case the United States had put forward 
a new ground for its prayer, but in both cases it sought 
to establish its own title to the fee, and 1the plea of 
res judicata was sustained. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote 
t'he decision for the Supreme Court, and in this ease 
he stated: 
"The best that can be said, apart frmn the act 
just quoted, to distinguish the two suits, is that 
now the United States puts forward a new ground 
for its prayer. Formerly it sought to avoid the 
patents by way of forfeiture. Now it seeks the 
same conclusion by a different means,-that is to 
say, by evidence that the lands originally were 
excepted from the grant. But in this as in the 
former suit, it seeks to establish its own title to 
the fee. 
It may be the law in Scotland that a judg1nent 
is not a bar to a second attempt to reach the same 
result by a different medium concludendi. Phos-
phate Sewage: Co. v. Molleson, 5 Ct. Sess. Cas. 
4th Series, 1125, 1139; although in the same 
case on appeal Lord Blackburn seemed to doubt 
the proposition if the facts were known before. 
S. C. L. R. 4 App. Cas. 801, 820. But the whole 
tendency of our de.cisiJons vs to requiJr,e a platntiff 
to try his whole oause of action and his whole 
case at one time. He cannot even split up his 
claim (Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11; Trask v. Ha,rt-
ford & N.H. R. Co. 2 Allen, 331; Freeman, Judgm. 
4th ed. §§ 238, 241) ; and, a fortiori, he cannot 
divide the grounds of recovery. Unless the statute 
of 1889 put the former suit upon a peculiar foot-
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ing, the Fnited States u·as lwlflld then to ln·iu,rl 
forward all the grounds ~t had for d cclarin,r1 the 
patents void, and when the bill wa .... · d iscussl'd, was 
barred as to all by the decree. (Citing Ca~<-'~) 
(En1phasis added) 
In a subsequent ease before the United ~tatP~ ~u­
preine Court, the case of Baltimore S. S. Co. et al r. 
Phillips (1927), 274 F.S. 316, -1-7 S. Ct. 600, 71 L. Ed. 
1069, the Court had before it a case in 'Yhieh the plain-
tiff had brought an action in adn1iralty for injuries HUH-
stained, and a decision was rendered in the admiralt~· 
court. This sum was paid and the dPen•p satisfied. Nuh-
~equently. this action was brought, and the complaint 
alleged that there was negligencP on the part of the 
petitioners and that the individual sustained serious 
injuries as a result of said negligence. The petitioner~ 
answered and set up res judicata based upon the decrPP 
in admiralt)~. l\lr. Justice Sutherland in writing the 
opinion for the Court states: 
"Here the court below concluded that the 
cause of action set up in the second case was not 
the same as that alleged in the first, because th(' 
grounds of negligence pleaded were distinct and 
different in character; the ground alleged in the 
first case being the use of defective appliances, 
and in the second, the negligent operation of the 
appliances by the officers and co-employees. 
Upon pr.inciple, it is perfectly plain that the re-
spondent suffered but one ,actionable wrong, and 
was entitled to but one recovery, whether his 
injury was due to one or the other of several 
disttnct acts of alleged negligence, or to a com-
bination of some or .all of them. In either view, 
there would be but a single wrongful invasvon of 
10 
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a single primary right of the plaintiff, na1nely, 
the right of bodily safety, whether the acts con-
.stitut?}ng such invasion were one or rno;ny, simple 
or complex. 
"A cause of action does not consist of facts, 
but of the unlawful violati·on of a right which 
the facts show. The number and variety of the 
facts alleged do not establish more than one 
cause of action so long as their result, whether 
they be considered severally or in combination, 
is the violation of but one right by a single legal 
wrong. The mere multiplication of grounds of 
negligence alleged as causing the same injury 
does not result in multiplying the causes of action. 
'The facts are merely the means, and not the 
end. They do not constitute t'he cause of action, 
but they show its existence by making the wrong 
appear. "'The thtng, therefore, which in contem-
plation of law as its cause, becomes a ground for 
action, is not the group of facts alleged in the 
declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result of 
these in a legal wrong, the existence of whiJch, if 
true, they conclustvely evince." ' Chobanian v. 
\Vashburn Wire Company, 33 R.I. 289, 302, 80 A. 
394, 400 (Ann. Cas. 1913D, 730). 
"The injured respondent was bound to set 
forth in his first action for damages every ground 
of negligence which he claimed to exist and upon 
which he relied, and cannot be permitted, as was 
attempted here, to rely upon them by piecemeal 
in successive actions to recover for the same 
wrong and injury." (Citing cases) (Emphasis 
added) 
Our own rtah Supreme Court has considered this 
matter of res judicata on a cause of action, and ?\f r. 
Justice Wade in writing for the Court in the case of 
East ilhll Creek Water Company cs. Salt Lake City 
11 
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( 1945) 180 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863, S'tated as follows: 
"·This contention overlooks the fact that there 
are two kinds of cases where the doctrine of res 
judicata is applied: In the one the former action 
is an absolUJte bar to the maintenance of the 
second; it usually bars the successful party as 
well as t:he loser; it must be between the same 
parties or their privies; it applies not only to 
points and issues which are actually raised and 
,dedded there~'n but also to such as could have 
been therein ajudic.ated, but it only applies where 
the claim, demand or cause of action is the same 
in both cases. In such case the courts hold that 
the parties should litigate their entire claim, de-
mand and cause of action, and every part, issue 
and ground thereof, and if one of the pa·rties 
f.ails to raise .any po~nt or issue or to l.itig.ate any 
part of his claim, demand or cause of action and 
the matter goes to final judgment, such party 
may not .aga~n litigat.e that cla~m, demand or 
cause of acNon or .any issue, point or part thereof 
which he could have but failed to litigate in the 
fo.rmer act.ion. On the other hand where the 
claim, demand or cause of action is different in 
the two cases then the former is res judicata of 
the latter only to the extent that the former actu-
ally raised and decided the same points and issues 
which are raised in the latter." (Citing cases) 
(Emphasis added) 
The primary issue in this case, therefore, seen1s to 
be whether or not a new eause of action is stated by 
the second suit filed by the plaintiffs herein. The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined a ''cause of action" in the 
case of St.ate vs. California Packing Corporation (1943) 
105 U. 182, 1414 P.2d 386, at page 387, as follows: 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''Do such allegations state a cause of action 1 
As so often said, to state a cause of aetion a com-
plaint must show: 
"A primary right existing in the plaintiff; 
a primary duty with regard thereto imposed by 
law on the defendant; a delict by the defendant 
with respect to plaintiff's right." 
This same definition is recognized by numerous other 
coui,ts. See cases cited in Wor.ds and Phr,ases, Permanent 
Edition, Volume 6, "·Cause of Action,'' subparagraph 
"Primary Right and Infringement Thereof" in the 1962 
Pockert Supplement, Page 135. 
The right which the plaintiffs seek in both the first 
and second case is the right to cross the land of the 
defendants, by wa.y of an easement. The duty which it 
is claimed the defendants owe in each case is exactly 
the same, and that is the right to allow rthe plaintiffs to 
cross the land of the defendants and that the defendants 
have been delict by prohibiting and restraining the plain-
tiffs fro1n using defendants' land. Where these issues 
have been determined by the court they becmne res 
judicata as to any subsequent action. This is clearly set 
forth in Volume 30A, Am. Jur. "Judg1nents" Sections 
371 and 372, as follows: 
"§371. Generally.-It is a fundamental prin-
ciple of jurisprudence that material facts or ques-
tions which were in issue in a former action, and 
were there admitted or judicially determined, are 
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered there-
in, and that such facts or questions become res 
judicata and may not again be litigated in a 
subsequent aclion between the same parties or 
13 
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their pnv1es, regardless of the form the issue 
may take in the subsequent action, whether the 
subsequent action involves the same or a different 
form of proceeding, or whether the second action 
is upon the same or a different cause of action, 
subject matter, claim, or demand, as thP earlier 
action. In suCh cases, it is also immaterial that 
the two aetions are based on different grounds, 
or tried on different theories, or instituted for 
different purposes, and seek different relief .... 
§372. 111atters Not Previously Adjudicated-
Identical Causes of Action.-The phase of tlw 
doctrine of res judicata precluding subsequent 
litigation of the same cause of action is much 
broader in its application than a detennination 
of the questions involved in the prior action; the 
conclusiveness of the judgment in such case ex-
tends not only to matters actually determined, 
but also to other matters which could properly 
have been determined in the prior action. This 
rule applies to every question falling 'vithin the 
purview of the original action, in respect to mat-
ters of both claim and defense which could have 
been presented by the exercise of due diligence." 
(Emphasis added) 
To assume the position claimed by the appellant in 
this case could only lead to continuous and endless re-
litigations of matters. The respondent has searched for 
a case involving an identical fac;t situation of an ease-
ment, but has not found such a case. However, numerous 
cases are cited by the authorities to the effect that a 
elaim arising out of negligence is res judicata to a sub-
sequent case based upon negligence even though upon 
a different theory. (See Baltimore 8. 8. Co. et al v. 
Phill.ips (supra) 
14 
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The analogy to the negligence cases and the clain1 
made by the appellant herein may be used by saying: 
If the plaintiff sought to recover for a personal injury 
arising out of an automobile accident in which the plain-
tiff said there was negligence on the part of t'he defend-
ant, and tried to show negligence by aots of corn1nission 
but lost the lawsuit, the plaintiff could then come hack 
in and sue the defendant again on the basis of negligence, 
but this ti1ne claim acts of omission. It is tn1e the facts 
which may constitute negligent omission and negligent 
commission may not be identical, but they constitute 
but one cause of action. 
CONCLl~SION 
\Ve re,spectfully submit, therefore, that the issue 
sought to be determined by the plaintiffs in the first 
cause of action was whether or not the plaintiffs had 
the right-of-way or an easement upon the property of 
the defendants, and this issue was detern1ined by the 
court in the first instance. The second action involves 
exactly the same cause of action and is precluded frmn 
being raised a second time by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NIELSEN, CONDER & HAX~E~ 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants aud 
Respondents 
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